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COMMENTS
A SURVEY OF FEDERAL MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
28 U.S.C. § 1407
I.

-

INTRODUCTION

The addition of section 1407 to the United States Judicial Code' in
1968 permits the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 2 (the Panel)
to temporarily "transfer, for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, civil actions, having one or more common questions of fact,
pending in different judicial districts."3 The Panel first met in 1968, and4
adopted a set of ten provisional rules to govern its initial proceedings.
These provisional rules, amended slightly and expanded, were permanently
adopted and became effective November 24, 1969. 5 The Panel is scheduled
to meet in Washington, D.C. once each month for two days, during
which time it holds hearings on motions filed since the previous hearing,
and when appropriate, the Panel meets in other locations. 6 Since the
first order was issued by the Panel on September 13, 1968, 7 considerable
litigation has arisen pursuant to section 1407, and a need to review the
scope of its provisions is apparent. This Comment will consider the
policies underlying the enactment of section 1407; the tools provided by
Congress, the judiciary, and the Panel for its implementation; the opinions
and orders of the Panel; and the advantages and disadvantages experienced by the judiciary and the opposing litigants through the operation
of the statute.
II.

HISTORY

The need to provide a means for the control of complex or multiple
litigation has long been recognized. Multiple litigation - two or more
actions having one or more common questions of fact pending in one
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1969). See note 38 infra for text.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (Supp. IV, 1969), provides that the panel shall
consist of seven circuit and district judges designated by the Chief Justice of the
United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit. The first judicial panel
was appointed on May 31, 1968. 44 F.R.D. 389 (1968).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), published in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Nnws, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1898 (1968). 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)
(Supp. IV, 1969).
4. Robson, Multi-District Litigation: § 1407 In Operation, 14 ANTITRUST BULL.
109 (1969). The provisional rules are published in 44 F.R.D. 389 (1968).
5. The Rules of Procedure of the Panel are published in 47 F.R.D. 377 (1969);
28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1969). See note 150 infra for text.
6. See Robson, supra note 4, at 113.
7. In re Plumbing Fixtures Cases, 295 F. Supp. 33 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 1968) [hereinafter cited as JPML].
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federal district8 - and multidistrict litigation - two or more actions
having one or more common questions of fact pending in more than one
district 9 - present a situation where the parties would be forced to litigate,
and the courts would be forced to consider the same issues repeatedly in
the same or different districts respectively. It was evident that neither
current federal statutes nor rules provided a satisfactory vehicle for
effectively coping with this duplication of effort. In an attempt to expedite
the disposition of many similar claims at the trial level, rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, originally promulgated in 1937,10 permits
maintenance of a class action in appropriate cases where "the prosecution
of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would
create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, . *.."1 The original
rule allowed, in part, maintenance of a class action where similar interests
12
were represented and common questions of law or fact existed.
The need to consolidate for trial multiple litigation pending in the
same district was first provided for by statute in 1940. This statute was
superseded by rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 194813
which permits consolidation of actions for trial when cases involving
4
common questions of law or fact are pending in one district court.'
Subsection 1404(a) of the Judicial Code enacted in 1940 authorizes
a district court to transfer any civil action to any other district where
it might have been filed, if such transfer would be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.15 This section, based
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens,16 permits transfer to a more
convenient forum even though proper venue exists.
8. COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTIPLE LITIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1 (pt. 2),
as MANUAL].

J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 8 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited

9. Id.
10. 3B J.MooRE, FEDERAL PaxCTICE

ff 23.01, at 23-15 (2d ed. 1969).
11. FED. R. Civ. P.23(b) (1)(A).
12. FED. R.Civ. P.23(a) (2);3B J.MooRE, supra note 10, at 23-16 and Committee Notes following, at 23-17 to 23-19. For a discussion of the availability of Rule
23 in antitrust actions after the 1966 amendments to the FED. R. Crv. P., see generally
DeLone, The Use of Rule 23 Class Actions in Antitrust Litigation, 38 ANTITRUST
L.J. 101 (1969). For criticism of the broadened scope of revised Rule 23, see Franks,
Rule 23 - Don Quixote Has a Field Day: Some Ethical Ramifications of Securities
Fraud Class Actions, 46 CH.-KxNT L.Rv.1 (1969).
13. See 5 J.MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 42.02, at 42-44 (2d ed. 1969), citing
28 U.S.C. § 734 (1940), repealed by the Judicial Code of 1948.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

15. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
16. The United States Supreme Court adopted the common-law doctrine of
forum non conveniens for the federal courts in 1947. See 1969 Wis. L. Rzv. 653, 654,
citing Gulf Oil Corp. v.Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).

See also Norwood v. Kirk-

patrick, 349 U.S. 29, 30-32 (1955), where the Court distinguished the common law

doctrine of forum non conveniens from Section 1404(a), and held that the statute was
not so strict as the common law doctrine, as it permitted transfer rather than dis-
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However, neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the
statutory provisions 7 provide for the transfer of litigation for pretrial
purposes exclusively. Since only entire actions were transferable, section
1407 was enacted to provide for coordinated pretrial discovery in multidistrict actions where the various cases themselves will be tried in the
original (transferor) district.
The first collection of multidistrict cases having common issues of
fact and law stemmed from the government's prosecution of five major
motion picture industry producers, distributors and exhibitors", for violations of the Sherman Act. 19 The Government commenced its prosecution
in 1940,20 and during the sixteen years that litigation against those defendants was pending, 800 separate actions were filed against the defendants
and their subsidiaries. 21 The second group of cases involving multiple
litigation descended on the federal courts after the government's criminal
prosecution in 1960-61 of several electrical equipment manufacturers for
conspiring to fix prices and allocate business in violation of the Sherman
Act. 2 2 In that litigation, 1,933 actions 23 involving 25,62324 treble damage
17. Other federal statutory transfer provisions are: 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a),(b)
(1964) (transfer to a district court of order for deportation when issue of petitioner's
nationality is raised) ; 11 U.S.C. § 55 (1964) (transfer when action is filed in wrong
court of bankruptcy, or consolidation for convenience or when interest of parties is
best served) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (1964) (transfer when parties consent or stipulate
and court agrees) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1406(c) (1964) (transfer to Court of Claims when
action is mistakenly filed in district court and the transfer is in the interest of justice) ;
28 U.S.C. § 1506 (1964) (transfer to a district court where action is mistakenly filed
in Court of Claims and the transfer is in the interest of justice) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b)
(1964) (transfer of application for writ of habeas corpus to district court) ; FED. ADM.
R. 54 (transfer of limitation of liability proceedings); and FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b)
(transfer if in the interest of justice). See Comment, Consolidation of Pretrial
Proceedings Under Proposed Section 1407 of the Judicial Code: Unanswered Questions of Transfer and Review, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 558 (1965).
18. See Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings] ; Baldridge, Problems Raised in Multiple Litigation, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 635 (1966), citing United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) ; 70 F. Supp. 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1947) ; 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). For more extensive treatment

of the movie litigation, see M.

CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE LITIGA-

178-99 (1960), cited in Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust
Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621, 622 n.5 (1964).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 4 (1964).
20. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 141 n.3 (1948).
21. 1967 Hearings, supra note 18, at 5.
22. Neal & Goldberg, supra note 18, at 621. For additional treatment of the
electrical equipment cases, see generally 1967 Hearings, note 18 supra; A.B.A.
National Institute on Preparationand Trial of an Antitrust Treble Damage Suit, 38
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1968); Baldridge, supra note 18; Bane, Pretrial Discovery in
Multiple Litigation from the Plaintiffs' Standpoint, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 117 (1966) ;
O'Donnell, Pretrial Discovery in Multiple Litigation from the Defendants' Standpoint, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (1966) ; Symposia, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 91 (1968);
Note, The Problem of Venue in Multiple District Litigation, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW.
507 (1966) ; Comment, note 17 supra; 1969 WIs. L. REV. 653.
23. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
TION

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES COURTS 151 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 DIR. ANN. REP.].
24. See REPORT OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTIPLE LITIGATION or
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 4 (1967), cited in 1969 WiS. L. Rnv. 653, 655
Published byn.10
Villanova
Universitycited
Charles
School of LawReport].
Digital Repository,
1970number of claims
[hereinafter
as Widger
1967 Committee
The great
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claims 25 were brought in thirty-four districts. 26 The last of these cases
was finally disposed of by June 1967.27
To cope with the mass of litigation engendered by the electrical
equipment cases, Chief Justice Warren appointed a Coordinating Committee
for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts in September,
1961.28 This Committee was the predecessor to the present Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation.2 9 Section 1407 is based on the Committee's
experience in supervising the nationwide discovery proceedings in the
electrical equipment litigation.80 The Coordinating Committee considered
its function to be the development of methods of handling all types of
multiple litigation, including common disaster cases, products liability
cases and patent litigation, as well as antitrust cases. 31 The Committee
drafted the original version of section 1407, and in 1965 that proposed
32
legislation was approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
33
The bill was signed into law in 1968.
Contemporaneous with the drafting of the statute, the Coordinating
4
Committee prepared the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation.
The Manual was approved by the Judicial Conference in 1968 and distributed in 1969.35 The purpose of the Manual is to bring to the attention
of judges and counsel methods recommended by the Judicial Conference
for (1) the assumption of judicial control at the outset of complex litiwas due in part to that provision of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964), which

permits use of a defendant's criminal antitrust conviction as prima fade evidence against
that defendant in a civil action.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), permits a plaintiff injured by anything forbidden by
the antitrust laws to recover three times the actual damages sustained.
26. 1964 DIR. ANN. REP. at 153.
27. MANUAL, supra note 8, at viii.
28. 1967 Hearings,supra note 18, at 4.
29. Three of the nine members of the Coordinating Committee were later named
to the seven member Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. They are Chief Judges
Murrah and Becker, and Judge Robson.
30. H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1899. For additional legislative history
and background of section 1407, see generally S. RP. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967); 113 CONG. REc. 22,123 (1967); 114 CONG. Rzc. 4,924 (1968) (remarks of
Rep. Celler).
31. 1967 Hearings, supra note 18, at 5. Additional multiple litigation may arise
from violation of the anti-pollution or the securities laws. See generally Franks, supra
note 12; Note, The Problem of Venue in Multiple District Litigation, 41 NoT"R
DAME LAW. 507, 508 (1966). For consideration of the multiple litigation aspects of
products liability cases, see generally Silliman, Some Problems of Multiple Product
Liability Litigation in the Drug Industry, 20 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 244 (1965).
32. DIRECTOR Ol THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS Olt THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

12, 13 (1965). 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1964) provides, in part, that the Judicial Conference
of the United States, composed of members of the federal judiciary, shall:
carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of
practice and procedure . . . in use. . . . Such changes in and additions to those
rules . . . shall be recommended by the Conference from time to time to the
Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption. ...
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1969).
34. See note 8 supra.
35. Von Kalinowski, Trial of an Antitrust Treble Damage Suit: The Defendant's
Viewpoint, 38 ANTITRUST L.J. 58, 62 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8
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gation, (2) the development of a plan for discovery and pretrial preparation and (3) a comprehensive plan for the conduct of all phases of the
trial.8 6 While it is directed primarily toward all types of complex litigation,
the Manual supplements the statute and procedural rules adopted by the
Panel by providing additional tools which are helpful in identifying
multidistrict litigation, conducting pretrial proceedings, and dealing with
37
the problem of conflicting class actions.
III.

PRESENT TOOLs AVAILABLE IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

A.
1.

Section 1407

Statutory Scheme and its JudicialInterpretation

As previously noted, the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts drafted section 140738 on the
36. Id. at 63. To accomplish its purpose, the Manual contains a compilation of
suggested procedures for pretrial and trial of complex and multidistrict litigation, and
in the second part an appendix of materials to be used in implementing the suggested procedures.
37. For an introductory critique of the Manual, see Comment, Observations on the
Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 68 MicH. L. R~v. 303 (1969).
The Manual's suggestions concerning identifying multidistrict litigation are considered at note 43 infra and the problem of conflicting class actions is considered
at pp. 928-30 infra.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1969), provides:
§ 1407. Multidistrict Litigation
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by
the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its
determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such
actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before
the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however, That
the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim
and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
(b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted
by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation. For this purpose,.upon request of the panel, a circuit judge
or a district judge may be designated and assigned temporarily for service in the
transferee district by the Chief Justice of the United States or the chief judge
of the circuit, as may be required, in accordance with the provisions of chapter
13 of this title. With the consent of the transferee district court, such actions
may be assigned by the panel to a judge or judges of such district. The judge
or judges to whom such actions are assigned, the members of the judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation, and other circuit and district judges designated when
needed by the panel may exercise the powers of a district judge in any district
for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
(c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section may be
initiated by(i) the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation upon its own initiative, or
(ii) motion filed with the panel by a party in any action in which transfer for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings under this section
may be appropriate. A copy of such motion shall be filed in the district court
in which the moving party's action is pending.
The panel shall give notice to the parties in all actions in which transfers
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings are contemplated, and such
noticeUniversity
shall specify
theWidger
time and
place
of any
hearing
to determine
whether such
Published by Villanova
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basis of their experience with the electrical equipment antitrust litigation.
The Committee took the view that enforced centralization of pretrial
proceedings in related multidistrict cases would minimize the costs and
burdens caused by overlapping and conflicting discovery.3 9 Consequently
section 1407 was adopted to provide statutory authority for pretrial consolidation and coordination of actions sharing common questions of fact
pending in different districts. This statute provides centralized management of pretrial proceedings under court supervision to assure the just
and efficient conduct of such actions. The statute authorizes the mandatory
transfer of venue for coordinated pretrial proceedings. Consequently, the
judiciary no longer must rely on the voluntary agreement of all parties
transfer shall be made. Orders of the panel to set a hearing and other orders
of the panel issued prior to the order either directing or denying transfer shall
be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court in which a transfer hearing
is to be or has been held. The panel's order of transfer shall be based upon a
record of such hearing at which material evidence may be offered by any party
to an action pending in any district that would be affected by the proceedings
under this section, and shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of
law based upon such record. Orders of transfer and such other orders as the panel
may make thereafter shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court

of the transferee district and shall be effective when thus filed. The clerk

of the transferee district court shall forthwith transmit a certified copy of

the panel's order to transfer to the clerk of the district court from which

the action is being transferred. An order denying transfer shall be filed in each
district wherein there is a case pending in which the motion for transfer has
been made.
(d) The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice of the
United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit.
The concurrence of four members shall be necessary to any action by the
panel.
(e) No proceedings for review of any order of the panel may be permitted
except by extraordinary writ pursuant to the provisions of title 28, section 1651,
United States Code. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review an order of
the panel to set a transfer hearing and other orders of the panel issued prior to
the order either directing or denying transfer shall be filed only in the court of
appeals having jurisdictions over the district in which a hearing is to be or has
been held. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review an order to transfer or
orders subsequent to transfer shall be filed only in the court of appeals having
jurisdiction over the transferee district. There shall be no appeal or review of an
order of the panel denying a motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated
proceedings.
(f) The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(g) Nothing in this section shall apply to any action in which the United
States is a complainant arising under the antitrust laws. "Antitrust laws" as
used herein include those acts referred to in the Act of October 15, 1914, as
amended (38 Stat. 730; 15 U.S.C. 12), and also include the Act of June 19, 1936
(49 Stat. 1526; 15 U.S.C. 13, 13a, and 13b) and the Act of September 26, 1914,
as added March 21, 1938 (52 Stat. 116, 117; 15 U.S.C. 56) ; but shall not include
section 4A of the Act of October 15, 1914, as added July 7, 1955 (69 Stat. 282;
15 U.S.C. 15a).
Added Pub.L. 90-296, § 1, Apr. 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 109.
For comments on section 1407, see Body, Pre-Trial Experience and Procedures,
A.B.A. SECTION oF INS. NEG. AND COMP. L. PROCEEDINGS 588 (1968); Crocker,
Consolidated Pre-Trial for Multi-District Litigation, 35 INS. COUN. J. 604 (1968);
Robson, supra note 4; Note, The Problem of Venue in Multiple District Litigation,
41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 507 (1966) ; Comment, supra note 17.
39. CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTIPLE LITIGATION Olr
Tr
UNITeD STATES
DISTRICT COURTS, COMMENT ON PROPOSED § 1407, at 1 (1965) [hereinafter referred
to as COMMITTE COMMENT] cited in Comment, supra note 17, at 560-61.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8
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and all presiding judges, as was the case in the electrical equipment litigation, 40 but may resort to mandatory coordinated pretrial proceedings
conducted in one district. The essence of this change is:
[T]he exercise of judicial control over complex litigation plus a

positive plan for discovery and pretrial preparation ....

41

Section 1407 establishes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
and gives the Panel authority to: (1) initiate transfer proceedings and
hold hearings thereon; (2) transfer civil actions for consolidated pretrial
proceedings; (3) assign a judge or judges to conduct such proceedings,
and request the Chief Justice to make intercircuit assignments for this
purpose; (4) act as and designate other judges as deposition judges in
any district; and (5) remand transferred actions to the districts from
42
which they were transferred.
2.

Sectional Analysis
a. Relevant Factdrsin ConsideringTransfer

Subsection 1407 (a) permits the transfer of civil actions for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings where: (1) there exists one
or more common questions of fact; (2) those actions are pending in more
than one district and (3) transfer would be for the convenience of parties
and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of those
actions.4 3 The Panel must remand each action to the original transferor
district for trial unless a settlement has been reached. The Panel may
separate any claim from an action and remand it before the remainder
of the action is remanded. The legislative history of this section 4 4 suggests
40. H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1899.
41. MANUAL, supra note 8, at 18.
42. H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1900.
43. The Manual suggests several sources, such as counsel, other judges, district
court clerks, and others which the judiciary should consult to identify complex and
multidistrict litigation in its initial stages. MANUAL, supra note 8, at 9. These
potential sources may be expected to scrutinize actions filed to determine if any would
be handled appropriately under provisions of the Manual. As a further aid in identifying a complex case the Manual suggests three local rules which would require
district court clerks, judges, and attorneys to notify appropriate court officers of the
filing of potential complex or multidistrict litigation. Id. at 10. For example, suggested local rule 2, would require, in all civil cases, that an attorney filing a complaint, answer or other specifically required pleading also file a notice with the district
court clerk containing (1) a statement of the nature of the case; (2) an indication
of whether related actions had been filed in any other federal court or any state
court; and (3) full identification of any related actions filed. Id. at 212-13.
This laudable approach could be carried to a ridiculous extreme if counsel
were required to file the same information every time any pleading was filed. The
better rule would limit the application of this order to the initial pleading filed, and
impose on counsel a duty to notify the court if he subsequently learns of the filing
of related litigation. E.g., this approach has been adopted in the proposed amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (2) which provides: "A party who knows or later
learns that his response [in discovery proceedings] is incorrect is under a duty
seasonably to correct the response." FEDERAL RULES Ol CIVIL PROCEDUR*, (Foundation
Press, Inc., Mineola, N.Y., 1968) Proposed Amendments, at 278.
44. H.R. ReP. No. 1130, supra note 3.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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that if there were only one question of fact common to a small number
of cases, for example two or three, pending in different districts, it
would be unlikely that the Panel would order a transfer. In such a case,
it is doubtful whether a transfer would be for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses or would promote judicial efficiency. It is quite
conceivable, however, that in the cases that do share complex questions
of fact, transfer would be advantageous to parties, witnesses and the
judiciary. In allocating the burden of proof to the moving party, the
Panel cited this legislative history in the Scotch Whiskey cases 45 saying:
[WIhere, as here, there are a minimal number of cases involved in
the litigation the moving party bears a strong burden to show that
the common questions of fact are so complex and the accompanying
common discovery so time consuming as to overcome the inconvenience 40
to the party whose action is being transferred and its
witnesses.

The defendants, not having overcome their burden as a moving party,
were denied a motion seeking transfer of a case filed in Colorado to the
District of New Jersey. 47 The opposite result was reached in the Gypsum
Wallboard cases, 48 where the Panel ordered one case pending in Seattle
to join three other cases transferred to San Francisco, holding that where
"substantial common questions of fact [exist], transfer will generally
benefit the parties and witnesses, and the just and efficient conduct of
''49
this litigation will be furthered by the transfer.
The different result in these cases can be reconciled. In the Scotch
Whiskey cases, two actions shared only one common question of fact.
Since transfer of one action would not significantly further the efficient
conduct of the actions and the denial of transfer would not necessitate
duplicate discovery, the Panel refused to transfer one to join the other.
In the Gypsum Wallboard cases, however, four actions shared many common questions of fact. In that situation, the Panel thought transfer would
further the efficient conduct of the actions, as well as benefit the parties
and witnesses. In these two instances, the Panel demonstrated its sensitivity to variations in individual cases by adopting a pragmatic approach,
and not merely resorting to an arbitrary standard of minimum numbers
of actions involved to automatically deny transfer. In the first case little,
45. In re Scotch Whiskey, 299 F. Supp. 543 (JPML 1969).
46. Id. at 544. The court continued:

These factors do not emerge from the present record. Nor do these two

cases appear to be merely forerunners of many such actions ....
[W]e are not
convinced that the just and efficient conduct of the two cases will be furthered
by the transfer of one of the cases under § 1407 . . . [W]e see no reason why
the duplicative discovery envisioned by the defendants should occur. Counsel
for all parties under the guidance of the courts and using the procedures described
in the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation should be able to conduct
pretrial proceedings so that inconvenience to all parties and witnesses can be
minimized and duplicate discovery can be avoided.
47. Id.
48. In re Gypsum Wallboard, 303 F. Supp. 510 (JPML 1969).
49. Id. at 512.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8
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if anything, would be gained by transfer. In the second, several questions
of facts were common to all cases, and transfer was justified.
In the Photocopy Paper cases, 50 the Panel, on its own motion,
considered the transfer of six actions in four districts. After conducting
hearings, the Panel concluded that:
[Although] the predicate common questions of fact exist and that the
convenience of the parties and their witnesses would generally be
served by transfer,

. .

.the just and efficient conduct of the presently

pending actions would not be promoted by transfer at this time ...
The number of transferrable actions, their location, their lack of
complexity, their relative size, and most significantly the fact that
discovery is proceeding with a minimum expenditure of judicial
energies combine to make the immediate transfer of any of these actions
inconsistent with the goal of promoting the just and efficient conduct
of these actions.5 1
The Panel determined that transfer was not appropriate.
On another occasion, in the Texas Concrete Pipe cases, 52 the Panel
declined to transfer twenty-three cases pending in the Northern District
of Texas. The Panel considered these cases on its own motion, to
determine whether or not they could be combined with either the "East of
the Rockies" Concrete Pipe cases5" previously transferred to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, or with the "West of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe
cases 54 previously transferred to the Central District of California. The
Panel found that "[tfhere is no connection between the Texas cases and
the East of the Rockies cases: the defendants are entirely different, there
are no common witnesses, and the cases stem from different criminal proceedings." 55 The opinion went on to further distinguish the Texas cases
from the West of the Rockies cases, stating that although they are not
totally unrelated, and do "involve several common defendants, some common witnesses and a potential for common discovery ... these 23 [Texas]
cases are proceeding expeditiously and we do not believe that their
transfer to another district would promote their just and efficient conduct." 50
The Panel has justified transfer in numerous cases involving considerable inconvenience and additional cost to a party by stating that
the cost of litigating in the transferee district would be more than offset
by the savings in cost generated from the increased efficiency of coordinated discovery. 57 For example, in one of the Plumbing Fixture
50. In re Photocopy Paper, 305 F. Supp. 60 (JPML 1969).
51. Id. at 62.
52. In re Texas Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 1342 (JPML 1969).
53. In re "East of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 244 (JPML 1969).
54. In re "West of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe, 303 F. Supp. 507 (JPML 1969).
55. In re Texas Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 1342, 1343 (JPML 1969).
56. Id.
57. E.g., In re "West of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe, 303 F. Supp. 507, 509
(JPML 1969) ; In re Plumbing Fixtures, 302 F. Supp. 795, 796 (JPML 1969) ; In
re Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 239, 243 (JPML 1969); In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F.
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Cases,58 which was a class action brought by two individual plaintiffs,
the Panel held that the only additional expense and inconvenience that
would be caused by transfer of the action would be counsel's travel from
Chicago to Philadelphia. The Panel justified this transfer on the grounds
that "[h]ere, the sheer number of cases involved, the substantial identity
of factual issues and the potentially conflicting class action claims require
that all cases be transferred to a single district for consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings . . .-59
It can be seen that before transfer will be ordered it must be shown
that: (1) common questions of fact exist; (2) the convenience of the
parties and their witnesses would generally be served; (3) the just and
efficient conduct of the actions considered would be promoted. The fact
that the cost to litigate in the transferee district may be offset by savings
realized through consolidated discovery proceedings does not seem to be
one of the important factors considered by the Panel in this case.
b.

Factors Used in Determining the Transferee District

The legislative history refers to several factors that should be considered in the selection of a transferee district - the state of its docket;
availability of counsel; and sufficient courtroom facilities. 60 But some
other factors also appear to be relevant. They include: (1) the availability
of a judge or judges possessing the ability and the time to efficiently
conduct the pretrial proceedings in the transferee district ;61 (2) the situs
of documents and records for which discovery probably will be pursued ;02
(3) the situs of the incident giving rise to the litigation ;68 (4) the pattern
of settlement which may be expected 4 and (5) the central location of the
Supp. 1402, 1404 (JPML 1968). But see In re Grain Shipments; United States v.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 457, 458 (JPML 1969).
58. In re Plumbing Fixtures, 302 F. Supp. 795 (JPML 1969).
59. Id. at 796.
60. H.R. Rnp. No. 1130, supra note 3.
61. 1967 Hearings,supra note 18, at 19.
62. Id. at 45.
63. For example the location of an air crash disaster may be the decisive factor
as was the case in six separate disasters dealt with in Panel proceedings reported at

298 F. Supp. 1323 (JPML 1969); 298 F. Supp. 390 (JPML 1969); 297 F. Supp.
1039 (JPML 1969); 298 F. Supp. 353 (JPML 1968); 295 F. Supp. 51 (JPML
1968) ; 295 F. Supp. 45 (JPML 1968). See note 103 infra for the complete citation
of these cases.
64. See Comment, supra note 17, at 574-75, where the author states that:

[M]ass tort cases, such as air crashes, for example, in which liability is

either clear or limited because of damage ceilings, will seldom reach the court,
for the defendant will settle without permitting the case to be litigated. Even if
the trial stage is reached, one or two trials usually establish a pattern for settlement, [citing Galiher, The Defendant's Lawyer Looks at Settlement, 31 INs.
CO N. J. 65 (1964)]. It will nearly always be less costly in terms of time and
money, both for the courts and the parties, to conduct pretrial of a single action
and to try it individually than to conduct coordinated pretrial proceedings for
fifty different cases when only one is likely to come to trial [footnote omitted].
Such established settlement patterns may in many instances indicate to the panel
that transfer will be unnecessary.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8
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transferee district and its accessibility by air transportation. 5 The House
Report on section 1407 states that "[t]hese factors [considered in the
legislative history] do not lend themselves to precise measurement. Consequently, the [Coordinating] Committee believes that the informed discretion of the judiciary is the best method for resolving questions as to
when and where such cases should be transferred for pretrial."'6
In the Admission Tickets cases, 67 the Panel selected the Northern
District of Chicago as the transferee district, notwithstanding the fact
that six of eleven actions were pending in the Southern District of
New York and three of the eleven were pending in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. The reasons given for the decision were (1) that the
only action in which meaningful discovery had occurred was in Chicago;
(2) a judge68 had been appointed to handle all proceedings in the cases
pending in Chicago, whereas that was not true in New York and Philadelphia; (3) one of the actions, which included nearly 100 plaintiffs,
claimed damages perhaps twice as large as the aggregate of the cases
pending in New York and Philadelphia and (4) that more of the
defendants had their principal places of business in Chicago than in New
York or Philadelphia, and that several of the cases pending in New
York or Philadelphia had been settled.6 9 In In re IBM, 70 an action involving three cases, two of which were filed in the Southern District of
New York and one pending in the District of Minnesota, the Panel
selected the District of Minnesota as the transferee court. It ordered
both New York cases transferred to Minnesota because the assigned judge
was already familiar with the proceedings and would be able to insure
that consolidated proceedings were conducted fairly and expeditiously. The
assigned judge conducted the first pretrial conference, and under his
71
supervision, discovery progressed.
c. Pretrial Proceedings
Subsection 1407(b) provides that the consolidated pretrial proceedings
will be supervised by a judge or judges assigned by the Panel. When the
assigned judge is from the transferee district court, the consent of that
court is required for such a designation. The Panel is authorized to
request temporary intercircuit or intracircuit assignment of judges 72 to

particular districts to conduct these proceedings. This provision "is
designed to allow for the most efficient allocation of available judicial
65. Crocker, supra note 38, at 605.

66. H.R. Rrp. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1901.
67. In re Admission Tickets, 302 F. Supp. 1339 (JPML 1969).
68. Judge Robson of the Northern District of Illinois, also a member of the
Panel, was assigned for all purposes to the Admission Tickets cases filed in Chicago.
Id. at 1341.
69. Id.
70. In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796 (JPML 1969).
71. Id.
72. 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-96 (1964), provide the statutory authority for assignment
Published byofVillanova
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
judges University
to other courts.
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manpower. 73 The practical importance of this provision is reflected in
the fact that during the first eighteen months of its existence, 74 the Panel
ordered the transfer of 540 actions filed in 141 districts, involving nineteen
75
separate sets of multidistrict litigation.
A judge designated under this subsection to conduct the coordinated
pretrial proceedings is granted the "usual powers provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including authority to render summary judgment
to control and limit pre-trial proceedings, and to impose sanctions for
failure to make discovery or comply with pre-trial orders." 76 The only
express reservation of the district judge's authority is the requirement of
subsection (a) that each action transferred for coordinated pretrial proceedings be remanded for trial to the district from which it was transferred.
One commentator suggests that section 1407 "appears to prevent a transfer
'77
by this [transferee] court under any other federal transfer provisions.
To the contrary, the Panel has ruled that the transfer provisions of sections
1404(a) permitting a change of venue, 78 1406(a) permitting transfer to
cure defects, 79 and 1407 are not mutually exclusive but should be used
together where appropriate to efficiently dispose of multidistrict litigation. 0
The Panel's approach seems well founded in that the judge who conducted
the coordinated pretrial proceedings is in the best position to appreciate
those benefits to be gained by consolidation for trial, and what disadvantages would be incurred. The benefits would include the convenience
of parties and witnesses, the accessability of evidence intended to be
introduced, and more efficient judicial management. The disadvantages
of consolidation would be that in certain cases the interests of smaller
parties might be subordinated-to the interests of larger parties, 81 and that
73. H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1902.
74. June 26, 1968-December 31, 1969. See Robson, supra note 4, at 109-10.
75. Summary of Civil Actions Transferred Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, (as of December 31, 1969) enclosure to letter received from the Clerk of the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, Jan. 26, 1970, on file at Villanova Law Review Office.
Cf., DIRECTOR or THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE Olt THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR oP THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS

(1969)

(preliminary edition 1969), Transfer of Cases Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1407, page 11-48, for statistics of transfers as of July 7, 1969. Of those nineteen
different sets of litigation, fifteen were assigned to judges of the transferee district.
The remaining four sets were assigned to judges sent into the transferee district, one
of whom was from another circuit. In only one instance has a member of the Panel
been assigned to supervise litigation under section 1407. Hon. Edwin A. Robson was
designated to conduct the pretrial proceedings of In re Admission Tickets, 302 F.
Supp. 1342 (JPML 1969), in his home district, the Northern District of Illinois.
Summary of Civil Actions Transferred Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, supra.
76. Comment, supra note 17, at 561, citing COMMITTEE COMMENT, at 5. 28
U.S.C. § 1407(b) (Supp. IV, 1969), provides in part that:
The judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned, the members of
the . . . [Panel] . . ., and other circuit and district judges designated when
needed by the panel may exercise the powers of a district judge in any district
for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
77. Comment, supra note 17, at 561.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1964).
80. In re Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 239 (JPML 1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8
81. See note 182 infra, and accompanying text.
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the differing nature and extent of damages might tend to confuse the
jury if one is present. In any event, it is submitted that the judge handling
the coordinated pretrial proceedings is in the best position to weigh the
opposing arguments presented by counsel concerning consolidation for trial.
Another aspect of pretrial proceedings which must be examined is the
question of which court - the transferee or the transferor - has the
authority to determine whether the various related actions should be
combined as a class action. Conflicting class actions would result if two
different district courts ruled in favor of permitting exclusive class actions
in their respective courts affecting the same parties. The Panel has
considered the problem of conflicting class actions in two instances.8 2 In
the Antibiotic Drugs cases,83 some of the actions transferred contained
"potentially conflicting determinations of class actions on behalf of plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs."'8 4 The moving plaintiff requested the Panel
to exclude from the transferee court the power to determine the class
action issue. The Panel refused to do this, however, and held that:
[T]o grant such a request would deny to the transferee court the
power to resolve in early pretrial the potential conflict in multidistrict
class action determinations. Under the circumstances of this case,
denial of this power, if authorized by law, would not be in the
interest of justice and would8 5not promote the efficient and just
conduct of the affected action.
The Panel did not examine the issue of whether it had the statutory
authority to deny the transferee court the power to determine class action
issues. It merely avoided that question, and ordered the transfer of all
actions involved.
82. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (JPML 1968) ; In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402 (JPML 1968). In one other opinion, the Panel
briefly mentioned the issue, stating: "Determination of all matters involving questions of class actions shall be left to the sound judgment of [the transferee judge]."
In re Protection Devices, 295 F. Supp. 39, 40 (JPML 1968). The MANUAL addresses
the problem of conflicting class actions in multidistrict litigation. If two district
courts contemporaneously enter orders declaring that an action in each court shall
proceed as a class action for all parties similarly situated, then two courts of exclusive different jurisdictions would be exercising control over the same claim for
relief at the same time. The MANUAL prescribes three alternative solutions to this
problem : (1)
Informal spontaneous consultation and cooperation
between the concerned
judges and courts.
(2) Formal consultation and cooperation between the concerned courts, initiated and recommended by the Coordinating Committee for Multiple
Litigation, the chief judges of the courts of appeals for the districts concerned, or upon the initiative of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation under new § 1407, Title 28, U.S.C.
(3) Assumption of control, by one transferee district court of the pretrial
proceedings in all potentially conflicting class actions in multidistrict
litigation on transfer under § 1407 by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.
MANUAL, supra note 8, at 99-100.
83. In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402 (JPML 1968).

84. Id. at 1403.
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In the Plumbing Fixtures Cases,8 6 the Panel considered this problem
in detail. The City of New York had filed a class action under rule 2387
in the Southern District of New York on behalf of certain city, town, and
school district governmental units, and all public housing authorities
in the State of New York. In argument before the Panel, the city agreed
that pretrial proceedings should be tranferred to the Eastern District of
88
Pennsylvania to join other cases previously transferred to that district,
but argued that the class action question should be determined by the
transferor court, the Southern District of New York.8 9 Chief Judge
Becker, writing for the majority, disagreed with the City's contention that
under section 1407, the transferee court lacks the power to determine
the class action issue, and that such power remains in the transferor court
after transfer.9 0 After carefully analyzing sections 1407(a) and (b), he
concluded that the statute:
[Did] not permit the Panel to order a separate trial "of any separate
issue or .

.

. issues" which are also separable under paragraph (b) of

Rule 42 [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)]. This unequivocal
and obviously deliberate withholding from the Panel of power to
separate issues in a single civil action assigning one or more to the
transferee court and one or more to the transferor court is a clear,
precise and wise limitation on the powers of the Panel.
There are other clear indications that Congress did not intend to
permit the Panel to partition the issues in a single claim for relief
and to assign powers of supervision and decision of the separate parts
to two courts to be exercised contemporaneously. By authorizing the
Panel to transfer "civil actions" (not parts thereof) for coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings and by limiting the Panel's powers
of separation and remand to claims, cross-claims and counter-claims
or third-party claims, Congress has made it "impossible to read the
section as excising" the powers to determine the class action questions
from the order of transfer. 91
92
The opinion continued, quoting extensively from the legislative history,
to examine the background of class actions under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and referred to that section of the Manual for Complex
and Multidistrict Litigation which recommends that the class action issue
9
be considered at the First Principal (Preliminary) Pretrial Conference. 3
The opinion stated:

Unless the determination of the class action question is treated
as part of the pretrial proceedings, the transferee court will be unable
86. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (JPML 1968).
87. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23.
88. Those cases previously transferred are reported at 298 F. Supp. 483 (JPML
1968) and 295 F. Supp. 33 (JPML 1968).
89. 298 F. Supp. at 486-87.
90. Id. at 488.
91. Id. at 489-90. Cf. Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 5 (1949).
92. See material cited in notes 3 and 30 supra.
93. 298 F. Supp. at 490-94, citing at 494, MANUAL, supra note 8, at 14, 22, 23.
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to determine the parties (formal and represented) to the local and
transferred actions, will be unable to coordinate the pretrial proceedings and will be unable to control the simplification of the issues
through control of amendment of the pleadings, and through comprehensive control of discovery.
Another of the innumerable potential alarming consequences of
the construction of section 1407 submitted by the City is the conflict
and delay which may result from early appeals from class action
determinations. .... 94
The majority denied the City's motion to sever the class action question,
holding that if granted, the motion would result in an unauthorized and
unintended frustrating judicial amendment to the statute, and permit
contemporaneous dual control by two district courts of a single claim
for relief. 95
Concerning the question of class action determinations made by the
transferor court prior to transfer, the majority held that the transferee
court had the power under rule 2396 to review and revise any class action
order considered desirable or necessary in its discretion.9 7 Further, it
held that all discovery in progress and discovery orders in the transferor
court shall remain in effect unless modified or vacated by the transferee
court.

98

Judge Weinfeld, dissenting in part, was of the opinion that once a
motion under rule 23 had been argued or submitted to a judge in the
transferor court, the subsequent transfer of that action by the Panel prior
to the transferor judge's determination on the motion, does not divest the
transferor judge of jurisdiction to make his determination.9 9 The five
sentence dissent apparently concedes that the transferee judge has authority
to amend any order previously entered by the transferor judge, thereby
negating any real difference of opinion with the majority members as to
the transferee judge's control over transferred litigation.
The Panel has thus clearly established that under the statute, it may
transfer litigation involving conflicting class actions. The need for the
authority to do so is thoroughly explained in the majority opinion considered above, and is well justified by the background and legislative
history of section 1407.
d. Motions and Orders
Subsection 1407(c) permits the Panel, or any of the parties in an
action where transfer might be appropriate, to initiate proceedings for
transfer. The Panel is required to notify the parties in all actions in which
94. 298 F. Supp. at 494.
95. Id. at 495.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.

97. 298 F. Supp. at 496.
98. Id.

99. 298 F. Supp. 484, 497 (JPML 1968) (Weinfeld, J., dissenting).
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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transfer is being considered, and such notice must specify the time and
place of any hearing to be held. The Panel is required to hold a hearing
prior to the making of the transfer order. The legislative history states
that subsection (c) "requires a hearing upon notice to all parties to
determine whether a transfer shall be ordered."' 0 0 Judge Body of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania has indicated that after a motion to
transfer has been made, "[a] hearing will then be held, if necessary"''1 1
thereby implying that when transfer is denied no hearing will be held.
The Panel has not yet expressed its view on whether a hearing is required
in those cases in which transfer is denied and the statute is silent on this
point. It does not appear that the Panel has arbitrarily denied any litigant
a hearing. On the contrary, it has refrained from holding hearings only
when a hearing was waived by all parties. 10 2 If this practice continues,
there would seem to be no need to statutorily require a hearing in every
case. The Panel's discretion thus far has been sufficient to protect the
interests of all parties.
In those cases in which transfer is ordered, the order must be based
on the record of the hearing at which any party affected by the transfer
may offer material evidence. The order must be supported by findings
of fact and conclusions of law based on the record. This subsection
further enumerates the procedures for the filing of notice of hearing,
orders of transfer, orders denying transfer and any other orders the
Panel may make. Of the Panel's thirty-nine orders reported as of December 31, 1969, twenty-seven substantially ordered transfer, 10 3 six denied
100. H.R. ReP. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1902.

101. Body, supra note 38, at 592.
102. Cf. notes 156-57 and accompanying text, infra.
103. Transfer of most actions (in some cases the Panel found justification for
not transferring individual cases close to or at trial) was ordered in the following
cases (the party or parties who initially moved for consideration of transfer under
section 1407 is indicated after each case): In re Water Meters, 304 F. Supp. 873
(JPML 1969) (plaintiff). In re "West of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe, 303 F. Supp.
507 (JPML 1969) (defendant). In re Admission Tickets, 302 F. Supp. 1339 (JPML
1969) (Panel). In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796 (JPML 1969) (Panel and defendant).
In re "East of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 244 (JPML 1969) (Panel
and plaintiff). In re Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 239 (JPML 1969) (Panel). In re
Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402 (JPML 1969) (Panel). In re Antibiotic Drugs,
299 F. Supp. 1403 (JPML 1969) (Panel). In re Library Editions of Children's
Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139 (JPML 1969) (Panel). In re Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (JPML 1969) (plaintiff). In re Air Crash Disaster at
Hong Kong on June 30, 1967, 298 F. Supp. 390 (JPML 1969) (Panel). In re Air
Crash Disaster at the Greater Cincinnati Airport on Nov. 20, 1967, 298 F. Supp. 358
(JPML 1969) (Panel). In re Air Crash Disaster at the Greater Cincinnati Airport
on Nov. 20, 1967, 298 F. Supp. 355 (JPML 1969) (Panel). In re Gypsum Wallboard, 297 F. Supp. 1350 (JPML 1969) (defendant). In re Mid-Air Collision Near
Hendersonville, N. C. on July 19, 1967, 297 F. Supp. 1039 (JPML 1969) (defendant).
In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385 (JPML 1969) (plaintiff and defendant). In re Air Crash Disaster at the Greater Cincinnati Airport on
Nov. 20, 1967, 298 F. Supp. 353 (JPML 1968) (Panel). In re Plumbing Fixture
Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (JPML 1968) (Panel). In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298
F. Supp. 483 (JPML 1968) (Panel and defendant). In re Library Editions of
Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 1352 (JPML 1968) (defendant). In re Antibiotic
Drugs, 297 F. Supp. 1126 (JPML 1968) (defendant). In re Protection Devices and
Equipment, 297 F. Supp. 622 (JPML 1968) (Panel). In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8
F. Supp. 1402 (JPML 1968) (Panel and defendant). In re Air Crash Disaster at the
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transfer,1 0 4 and six denied a party's motion to vacate the conditional transfer order entered by the Clerk of the Panel. 10 5 The Panel initiated action
in twenty instances. 06
e. Standing and Jurisdiction
The Panel addressed the question of standing to request transfer in
the Western Liquid Asphalt cases, 10 7 in which the plaintiffs in six actions
filed in the Northern District of California moved to have all actions in
that litigation transferred to that district. The only case affected was
one pending in the Western District of Washington. The Panel interpreted
the following portion of subsection 1407(c) (ii) :
(c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section may
be initiated by ...

(ii) motion filed with the panel by a party in any action in
which transfer for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings under this section may be appropriate . . .10

to hold that "[s]ince the moving plaintiffs are not parties in any action
in which transfer is contemplated, we believe they lack standing to file
such a motion. Their motion will therefore be denied."' 1 9 The Panel could
have transferred this case to the Northern District of California on its own
initiative under subsection 1407(c) (i) but thought that the plaintiffs' lack
of standing should be controlling." 0
The question of the Panel's jurisdiction over the parties was neither
defined in the statute nor considered in the legislative history. But the
Panel has decided, consistent with the decisions under certain other
Greater Cincinnati Airport on Nov. 8, 1965, 295 F. Supp. 51 (JPML 1968) (Panel).

In re Air Crash Disaster at Ardmore, Okla., 295 F. Supp. 45 (JPML 1968) (Panel).
In re Protection Devices Equipment, 295 F. Supp. 39 (JPML 1968) (Panel). In re
Plumbing Fixture Cases, 295 F. Supp. 33 (JPML 1968) (defendant).
104. Transfer was denied in the following actions (the party who initially moved
for consideration of transfer under section 1407 is indicated after each case): In re

Western Liquid Asphalt, 303 F. Supp. 1053 (JPML 1969) (plaintiff). In re Texas
Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 1342 (JPML 1969) (Panel). In re Scotch Whiskey,
299 F. Supp. 543 (JPML 1969) (defendant). In re Air Crash Disaster at Falls
City, Neb. on Aug. 6, 1966, 298 F. Supp. 1323 (JPML 1969) (Panel). In re Concrete
Pipe, 297 F. Supp. 1125 (JPML 1968) (plaintiff). In re Eisler Patents, 297 F. Supp.
1034 (JPML 1968) (plaintiff).
105. The conditional transfer order is considered at p. __ infra. A party's motion
to vacate the conditional transfer order was denied in the following cases (the
party who initially moved to vacate the order is indicated after each case) : In re
Grain Shipments; United States v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 457
(JPML 1969) (defendant). In re Antibiotic Drugs; England v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,
303 F. Supp. 1056 (JPML 1969) (plaintiff). In re Gypsum Wallboard, 303 F. Supp.
510 (JPML 1969) (plaintiff and defendant). In re Plumbing Fixtures, 302 F. Supp.
795 (JPML 1969) (plaintiff). In re Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp. 794 (JPML
1969) (defendant). In re Antibiotic Drugs, 301 F. Supp. 1158 (JPML 1969) (plaintiff).
106. See notes 103-05 supra. In some instances, more than one party moved for
consideration of transfer under section 1407. Plaintiffs initiated action in eleven instances, and defendant did so in fourteen instances.
107. In re Western Liquid Asphalt, 303 F. Supp. 1053 (JPML 1969).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (ii) (Supp. IV, 1969).
109. 303 F. Supp. at 1054.
110. Id.University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
Published by Villanova

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [1970], Art. 8
SUMMER

1970]

COMMENTS

transfer statutes,"' that it may order transfer notwithstanding the lack
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
In one of the Children's Books cases,11 2 the issue arose as to whether
the Panel could transfer a case under section 1407 if certain named defendants had neither been served with process nor been given notice of
the proposed transfer." 8 The Panel's opinion made an analogy to transfers
under subsections 1404(a) and 1406(a),1 4 stating "[iut is firmly established that transfers may be effected under either section even though a
defendant has not been served with process.""15 The opinion went on to
say that:
These cases demonstrate that lack of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant does not necessarily bar a transfer as a matter of constitutional law

. .

. The question before us, therefore, is one of statutory

interpretation: Did Congress intend and provide that § 1407 be
applicable only to cases in which all defendants have been served?116
The opinion analyzed the purpose of section 1407, the interests affected
by transfer and recourse available to defendants in the event of transfer,
before arriving at its conclusion that "the power of the Panel and the
courts to effectuate a transfer under § 1407 is not vitiated by the transferor
court's lack of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.""i 7 The Panel has
not considered the question of whether the requirements applied to transfers
under section 14 04 (a) and 1406 (a) by the United States Supreme Court that venue be proper and that personal jurisdiction could be obtained in
the transferee court" 8 - apply to transfers under section 1407.
Regarding the issue of notice, the Panel held that a section 1407
transfer is not precluded by the failure of an unserved defendant to receive
notice of the proposed transfer." 9 The only reason offered in support
of this holding was that such a restriction of the Panel's authority,
contingent on its locating and notifying defendants not served by plaintiffs,
would severely impede the effectiveness of section 1407.120 It is suggested
that such a procedure is justified, since to bar the Panel from assuming
jurisdiction in such a case would "frustrate the salutory purposes of § 1407
111. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1964). See cases cited in note 115 infra.
112. In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139 (JPML
1969).
113. Id. at 1141.
114. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1964).
115. 299 F. Supp. at 1141, where the Panel cited the following cases in support
of its point: Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962) (§ 1406(a)); United
States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964) (§ 1404(a)); Koehring Co. v.
Hyde Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963) (§ 1404(a)).
116. 299 F. Supp. at 1141, where the Panel cited Comment, Transfer in the Federal Courts in the Absence of Personal Jurisdiction,61 COLUM. L. REV. 902 (1961) ;
Comment, Change of Venue in Absence of Personal Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C.
1404(a) and 1406(a), 30 U. CHi. L. Rv. 735 (1963).
117. 299 F. Supp. at 1142.
118. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 464 (1962).
119. 299 F. Supp. at 1142.
120. Id.
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without meaningfully advancing any other interest.' 2 1 Under the Federal
Rules of Civil 'Procedure, proper service of the defendant must still be
made after transfer and a party so served may raise all motions he is
otherwise entitled to raise at that time in the transferor court.' 22 The
Panel failed to indicate, however, where such motions must be made. 12'3
It would seem that these motions would have to be raised in the transferee court, otherwise, the possibility of conflict exists since the transferee
court would have jurisdiction over all action in the litigation except the
one in which service is being resisted. That case would be determined
by the transferor district, and if this were in another circuit, two different
courts of appeals could possibly be embroiled in the situation. To avoid
this, the Panel may eventually be forced to decide that such motions must
be made in the transferee court.
The Panel was confronted with the jurisdictional question in one
of the Gypsum Wallboard cases, 12 4 in which a defendant opposed transfer
on the grounds that the transferor court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. The Panel again avoided deciding where such motions
must be raised and merely compelled the defendant to bring them in the
transferee court, saying that:
[M]otions to quash service or dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are
being routinely considered by courts to which multidistrict litigation
has previously been transferred and we see no good reason 25why [the
defendant] can not pursue its remedies following transfer.
The Panel has avoided a specific holding that these motions must be
brought in the transferee court. Rather, it has tacitly resorted to that
course. Perhaps after considering more of these motions, it may decide
to set forth a specific holding to that effect, or seek to have that requirement
added as an amendment to section 1407.
f.

Scope of Appellate Review

Subsection 1407(e) limits appellate review of the Panel's action. There
may be no review of a Panel decision denying a motion to transfer. A
Panel order granting a hearing, and orders issued prior to an order
disposing of a motion, may be reviewed only in the court of appeals having
jurisdiction over the transferor district. Review of orders transferring
cases or of orders subsequent to transfer is permitted only in the court
of appeals having jurisdiction over the transferee court. The only review
permitted by the statute is the filing of a petition for an extraordinary writ
121. Id.
122. Id. at n.1. For example, the defendant initially served notice in the transferor court may raise motions to quash service or dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
123. Id.
124. In re Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp. 794 (JPML 1969).
125. Id., citing Monkelis v. Trans World Airlines, 303 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Ky.
1969).
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under title 28, section 1651. 121 The statute clearly limits review so that
only one court of appeals will have jurisdiction over the reviewable issue.
The drafters' reasons for limiting review were expressed by Judge Becker
during Senator Tydings' subcommittee hearings on proposed section 1407.
He stated that:
[Ilf the actions to be transferred by the panel were pending in several
circuits, and the transfer orders were entered in the district courts
of the several circuits, review proceedings might be filed in several
Circuit Courts of Appeals. This could easily result in conflicting
decisions of the Courts of Appeals on the validity of the transfer of
orders. Much delay could ensue, which would prejudice the efficient
disposition of the litigation ordered to be transferred and defeat the
purposes of the bill.
In order to avoid the confusion and delay which might otherwise
result, paragraph (c) provides that the order of transfer, and such
other orders as the panel may make, shall be entered in the office of
the clerk of the district court of the transferee district and shall be
effective when entered. Further, it is expressly provided in paragraph (e) that no proceedings for any review of an order of the
panel may be entertained by any courts other than the United States
Court of Appeals having jurisdiction over the transferee District Court
and the Supreme Court of the United States. These provisions are
very important because they avoid the possibility of multiple review
proceedings and conflicting rulings which could frustrate and paralyze the operation of the temporary transfer procedures. At the same
time paragraph (e) designates competent courts to entertain whatever
27
review proceedings may be appropriate under the circumstances.'
Review by mandamus in the court of appeals having jurisdiction
over the transferee court, being the only review provided, avoids consideration of the merits of the issue and affords the appellate court the
opportunity to order the lower court to perform some act.I 28 The legislative
history indicates that this procedure is more expeditious than appeal,
and therefore is consistent with the purpose of the statute since the
efficient disposition of appellate review contributes to the efficient disposition of the litigation. The legislative history further states that review
of the denial of an order to transfer is not considered necessary or desirable, because denial does not adversely affect the course of litigation.' 2 9
This is true in the narrowest sense since the Panel has shown itself to
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964) provides:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a
court which has jurisdiction.
127. 1967 Hearings, supra note 18, at 18-19.

128.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1113 (4th ed. 1951) defines mandamus as a writ

directed to, among others, an inferior court, commanding the performance of a particular act.
129. See H.R. Rtp. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1902.
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be extremely pragmatic in its approach to cases considered, and has given
no indication of arbitrary or capricious tendencies. However, it is to be
noted that if the Panel were to arbitrarily or capriciously deny transfer,
the parties concerned would not have access to the advantages of transfer
under section 1407,130 and therefore no recourse would be available. Moreover, under subsection 1407(c), the Panel would not even be required
to conduct a hearing in those cases where transfer was denied because
a hearing is required only when the transfer is ordered.' 8 '
The necessity for appellate review as a needed safeguard, may be
determined from an examination of the Panel's past performance. The
Panel has denied plaintiffs' motions to transfer for several reasons. In
the Eisler Patents cases 13 2 involving twenty-four actions in four districts, the Panel held that "no useful purpose contemplated by section
1407 would be served by the transfer of any of the pending cases to any
other district.' u83 In the "West of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe cases,'13 4
the Panel refused to transfer one newly filed case to another district in
which three cases were nearly ready for trial, holding that such transfer
would not "promote the just and efficient conduct of these actions."'1 35 In
the Western Liquid Asphalt cases, 136 the Panel refused to grant a motion
made by plaintiffs because those parties lacked standing to file a motion
for transfer. 13
In the Scotch Whiskey cases' 3 8 a defendant's motion
to transfer was denied on the ground that the just and efficient conduct
of the two actions involved could not be furthered by a section 1407
transfer. 18 In these instances, the Panel has demonstrated legitimate
grounds for denial of transfer. The reasons given in each case - no
useful purpose would be served by transfer, transfer would not promote
the just and efficient conduct of the actions and lack of standing to move
for transfer - were based on a fair appraisal of the facts and due consideration of all interests. Therefore there would appear to be no need for
review of these orders denying transfer.
One writer has advanced the position that no appellate review of the
Panel's tranfer orders is necessary since "such an august membership
should be sufficient to guard against any miscarriage of justice. There
is no reason to assume that any court of appeals would be more qualified
130. See notes 175-182 and accompanying text infra.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1969).
132. In re Eisler Patents, 297 F. Supp. 1034 (JPML 1968).
133. Id. The reasons given by the Panel as justification for its denial of transfer
were that of the twenty-four cases involved, fifteen were pending in the Central
District of California, thirteen of which were dismissed by the presiding judge: The
remaining two cases were then being actively litigated. It may be surmised that the
Panel was of the opinion that some or all of the cases pending in the other three
districts would also be dismissed.
134. In re "West of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe, 297 F. Supp. 1125 (JPML
1968).
135. Id. at 1126.
136. In re Western Liquid Asphalt, 303 F. Supp. 1053 (JPML 1969).
137. Id. See text accompanying notes 107-10 supra.
138. In re Scotch Whiskey, 299 F. Supp. 543 (JPML 1969).
139. Id.
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than the panel to judge the issues involved.' 1 40 In view of the con141
siderations articulated by the Panel in its first thirty-nine orders,
the above argument seems to be convincing. The Panel has brought to
bear on its decisions the collective judgment of its members; thus, it
would seem that more, not less, judicial talent is applied to these rulings
than would normally be the case with a three judge circuit court of
appeals decision. 14 2 However, notwithstanding the Panel's enlightened
discretion or its judicial expertise, the fact remains that decisions of the
courts of appeals are subject to discretionary review by the United States
Supreme Court, while there is no review whatsoever of a panel order
denying transfer.
g.

Exemption of Government Actions
7

Subsection 140 (g), added at the request of the Department of
Justice,148 excludes from the operation of section 1407 antitrust actions
brought by the United States. The reasons given in support of this
exception are that private plaintiffs would be induced "to file actions
merely to ride along on the Government's cases ;-'144 that the delay caused
by the additional filings in the Government's suit would disadvantage those
injured competitors waiting to predicate their damage actions on the
outcome of the Government cases ;145 and that there is no need for private
actions to be joined with government actions since subsection 5(b) of
the Clayton Act 1 46 tolls the running of the statute of limitations on their
damage suits while the Government action is pending. 147 However, subsection 1407(g) permits the joining of any suit for damages brought by
the United States under the antitrust laws 48 with a criminal prosecution.
This is not inconsistent since in this instance the Government is suing in
a proprietary capacity, the same as the private parties excluded by this
subsection.149 It is allowed, obviously, to promote the efficient conduct of
140. Comment, supra note 17, at 565-66.
141. See notes 103-105 supra.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1964) provides that cases before the Court of Appeals:
shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not more than three
judges, unless a hearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the
circuit judges of the circuit.
28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1964) provides in relevant part that:
The chief judge of a circuit may designate and assign one or more district
judges within the circuit to sit upon the court of appeals or a division thereof
whenever the business of that court so requires.
143. H.R. Rzp. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1902.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1902-03.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
147. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark to Hon. Emanuel
Celler, Jan. 7, 1966, cited in, 1967 Hearings, supra note 18, at 84.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1964) provides that:
Whenever the United States is hereafter injured in its business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefor in the
United States district court for the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover actual damages by it sustained and the cost of suit.
149. See H.R. RxP. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1903.
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actions, as provided in subsection 1407(a). To prohibit such joinder of
government criminal and civil actions would be contrary to the purpose
of the statute.
3.

Impact of the Statute

The Panel's performance has fulfilled the expectations of the drafters
of section 1407. They have transferred actions to suit the convenience of
parties and witnesses while promoting the efficient administration of
justice. They have demonstrated an appreciation for the unique factors
of individual actions before them and have given sound reasons for the
disposition of those actions. Some areas in which statutory amendment
might be considered in order to give legislative approval to policies adopted
by the Panel are: jurisdiction of transferor courts; standing to file motion
for transfer and review of orders denying transfer. While there has been
no indication that these potential amendments are necessary at this time, the
legislative history and the statute are silent on the first two points. This
suggests that those two situations were not considered by Congress prior
to passage of section 1407. Even though the Panel has not abused its
power, nor acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the legislature could now
express its judgment on these points. As for the limited scope of review,
the legislature has clearly expressed its view. There does not appear to
be any present need to challenge the prohibition of review of orders
denying tranfer, but that need could arise in the future.
B. Panel Rules of Procedure
The Rules of Procedure' 5 adopted by the Panel pursuant to section
1407(f) implement certain provisions of the statute'' and prescribe
150. See note 5 supra. The Rules are:

Rule 1. Definitions
As used in these Rules "Panel" means all available but not less than four
members of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation appointed by the Chief
Justice of the United States pursuant to Section 1407, Title 28, United States

Code.

"Clerk" means the person or official appointed by the Panel to act as Clerk
of the Panel and shall include those deputized by the Clerk to perform or assist
in the performance of his duties.
"Chairman" means the Chairman of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States pursuant to Section
1407, or the member of the Panel designated by the Panel to act as Chairman in
the absence or inability of the appointed Chairman.
A "tag-along case" refers to a civil action apparently sharing common questions of fact with actions previously transferred under Section 1407 and which
was filed or came to the attention of the Panel after the initial hearing in the
litigation.
Rule 2. Place of Keeping Records and Files

The records and files of the Panel shall be kept by the Clerk in the offices

of the Panel. Records and files may be temporarily removed to such places at
151. See rules 1-7, and 9-11, note 150 supra. Rule 3 is analogous to FED. R.
to FED. R. App. P. 25, 27-28, 31 and 32 re-

App. P. 46; rules 4-7 are analogous
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methods of dealing with three situations not covered by the statute.
These items include: (1) designation and disposition of a tag-along
case - "a civil action apparently sharing common questions of fact with
actions previously transferred under section 1407 and which was filed or
came to the attention of the Panel after the initial hearing in the litiga150. (Continued)such time as the Panel or the Chairman of the Panel shall direct.
Rule 3. Admission to Practice Before Panel
Every member in good standing of the Bar qf any District Court of the
United States is entitled without condition to practice before the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation. No such member shall be required to employ or
associate local counsel. There shall be no fee for admission to practice before
the Panel.
Rule 4. Place and Manner of Filing of Papers
All papers filed for consideration by the Panel shall be filed with the Clerk
of the Panel by mailing to the Clerk, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
c/o Supreme Court Building, Washington, D. C. 20544, or by delivering to the
office of the Panel, Room 610, Export-Import Bank Building 811 Vermont
Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. No fee shall be required for the filing of any
such papers. An original and nine copies of each paper shall be filed with the
Clerk.
Rule 5. Service of Papers Filed
Papers filed with the Clerk shall be accompanied by proof of service on all
other parties in all the cases involved in the litigation. Service and proof of
service shall be made as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 6. Motion Practice
All requests for action by the Panel shall be made by written motion as
provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Every motion shall be accompanied by a brief in support thereof in which the factual and legal contentions of
the movant shall be concisely stated in separate portions of the brief with citation of applicable authorities. See Rule 28, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Within fifteen days after service of a motion, the opposing party or parties shall
file and serve a brief in opposition thereto. The movant may, within five days
after service of a brief in opposition, file a brief in reply.
Rule 7. Form of Papers Filed
(a) Averments in any motion seeking action by the Panel shall be made in
numbered paragraphs, each of which shall be limited, as far as practicable, to a
statement of a single factual averment. Responses to averments in motions shall
be made in numbered paragraphs, each of which shall correspond to the number
of the paragraph of the motion to which the responsive paragraph is directed.
Each responsive paragraph shall admit or deny wholly or in part the averment of
the motion, and shall contain the respondent's version of the subject matter when
the averment or the motion is not wholly admitted.
(b) Each document filed shall be flat and unfolded, shall be plainly written,
typed in double space, printed or prepared by means of a duplicating process,
without erasurers or interlineations which materially deface it, on opaque, unglazed, white paper approximately 8-/2 x 11 inches in size with numbered lines,
and shall be secured on the left margin. Each shall bear the caption, descriptive
title and number, if any, of the action or proceeding in which it is filed, and on
the final page thereof shall contain the name, address and telephone number of
the attorney in active charge of the case.
Rule 8. Submission of Proof of Facts
So far as practicable and consistent with the purposes of Section 1407 the
offering of oral testimony before the Panel shall be avoided. Accordingly, oral
testimony shall not be received except upon notice motion and order of the Panel
expressly providing for it. Proof may be submitted as provided in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 9. Withdrawal of Exhibits
Exhibits submitted to the Panel may be returned to or withdrawn by counsel
or a party on order of the Chairman or the Panel.
Rule 10. Failure to Comply with Rules
Documents which fail to comply with the provisions of these Rules shall be
filed by the Clerk, subject to being stricken by the Panel on its own initiative or
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8
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5
tion ;-152 (2) hearing procedures and (3) motions for extensions of time.6'
Each of these matters not considered in the legislative history nor mentioned
in the statute will be examined.

1.

Tag-along case and the conditional transfer order

Rule 12 authorizes the Clerk of the Panel to enter a conditional
order transferring any tag-along case.15 4 The need for some method of
152. Rule 1, note 150 supra.
153. The statute does not mention the authority of the Clerk of the Panel.
Through the rules, the Panel delegates significant authority to the Clerk. Rule 12
authorizes the Clerk to conditionally transfer tag-along cases, subject to review by
the full Panel if transfer is opposed. Rule 14 authorizes the Clerk to act on all applications for an extension of time to file pleadings or to perform other acts required
by the rules. E.g., File motions under rule 6; comply with rule 11 Show Cause
Orders; or file notice and briefs in opposition to rule 12 conditional transfer orders.
154. Upon entry, the conditional order is automatically stayed for ten days during which time any party may file notice of his opposition to the transfer. When
such notice is filed, the conditional order is stayed pending the further order of the
Panel. A party opposing transfer must file, within ten days of his notice of opposition, a motion to vacate the conditional order accompanied by a supporting brief
and must also request a hearing if one is desired. A party failing to file his motion
and brief in opposition is deemed to have withdrawn his opposition to transfer. See
rule 12, note 150 supra.
150. (Continued)motion of a party.
Rule 11. Show Cause Orders
Civil actions may be transferred on the initiative of the Panel pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407(c) (i). If transfer of the particular multidistrict litigation is being
considered for the first time, an order will be entered by the Panel directing the
parties to show cause why the actions should not be transferred for consolidated
or coordinated pretrial proceedings. At the discretion of the Panel, a hearing
may be set at the time the show cause order is entered. Any party may file a
response to the show cause order and an accompanying brief within fifteen days
of the filing of said order unless otherwise provided for in the order. Within
five days of receipt of a party's response or brief, any party may file a reply brief
limited to new matters. Responses and replies thereto shall be filed and served in
conformity with Rules 4, 5, 6 and 7 of these Rules.
Rule 12. Conditional Transfer Order
Upon learning of the pendency of a tag-along case the Clerk of the Panel
shall as soon as practical enter a conditional order transferring it to the previously
designated transferee court on the basis of the prior hearing or hearings and for
the reasons expressed in previous opinions and orders in the litigation. The
effective date of this order shall be stayed ten days from the entry thereof to
afford all parties the opportunity to oppose the transfer, unless the stay is further
extended by the Panel.
Any party opposing the transfer shall file a Notice of Opposition with the
Clerk of the Panel within the ten-day period. Upon receipt of a timely filed
Notice of Opposition the Clerk shall enter an order extending the stay of the
conditional transfer order until further order of the Panel. Within ten days of
the filing of its Notice of Opposition, the opposing party shall file and serve on
all parties a motion to vacate the conditional transfer order and a brief in support
thereof and shall notify the Panel if a hearing on the opposition is desired.
Failure so to file and serve shall be deemed withdrawal of the opposition.
Motions to vacate orders of the Panel and responses thereto shall be governed
by Rules 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of these Rules.
Rule 13. Hearings
The Panel shall convene whenever and wherever desirable or necessary in
the judgment of the Chairman or of four members of the Panel. The Chairman
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transferring related cases filed after the Panel initially considered the
litigation concerned is apparent. The Panel members each have full time
judicial duties to perform in their respective courts, and could not hope to
continuously oversee disposition of related litigation. The delegation of
the power to transfer conditionally cases related to litigation considered
earlier by the Panel is an efficient method of keeping pace with related
litigation while preserving all parties' rights to oppose transfer and to
demand a hearing by the Panel. Sixteen percent of the cases considered by
155
the Panel in its first six months of operation were tag-along cases,
which would otherwise have had to wait for formal hearing by the
Panel before they could be transferred. This rule well defines the guidelines that the Clerk is to follow and the procedure for review of the
Clerk's decision adequately safeguards the interests of all parties.
155. Robson, supra note 4, at 111-12.
150. (Continued)-

shall determine which matters shall be set for hearing at each session and the

Clerk shall give notice to counsel for all parties involved in the litigation of the

time, place and subject matter of such hearing.
Counsel for those supporting transfer under Section 1407 and counsel for
those opposing such transfer are to meet separately prior to the hearing for the
purpose of organizing their arguments and selecting spokesmen to present all
views without duplication.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Panel, one hour will be allotted for matters
being considered for the first time and thirty minutes shall be allotted for tagalong cases. The time shall be divided equally among those favoring and those
opposing transfer. Counsel for those parties favoring the transfer will be heard
first except in hearings on tag-along cases in which the objecting party will be
heard first.
The issuance of a show cause or hearing order does not affect or suspend
orders and discovery proceedings in the District Courts in which the cases are
pending.
Rule 14. Motions for Extensions of Time
Any motion or application for an extension of time to file a pleading or perform an act required by these Rules may be acted upon by the Clerk, whether
addressed to him, to the Panel or to a Judge thereof. Any party aggrieved by
the Clerk's action on such motion or application may submit its objections to
the Panel for consideration by the Panel.
Rule 15. Remand
(a) The Panel shall consider remand of each transferred action or any
separable claim, cross-claim or third-party claim at or before the conclusion of
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings on
(i) motion of any party filed with the Clerk of the Panel in conformance
with Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 of these Rules, or
(ii) suggestion of the transferor or transferee Judge, or
(iii) its own initiative.
(b) Actions will be remanded to the district from which they were transferred unless an order has been signed by the designated transferee Judge transferring an action to another district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a). Such actions will be remanded by the Panel to the district designated
in the Section 1404(a) or Section 1406(a) order.
(c) Actions terminated in the transferee court by settlement, dismissal or
summary judgment shall not be remanded by the Panel. The original file and a
copy of the termination order should be returned to the Clerk of the original
transferor court.
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The conditional transfer order has been opposed in six cases.' 56 In
five of these cases, the party opposing the transfer waived hearing. 1 7 In
all six cases the Panel supported the action of the Clerk by denying the
parties' motion to vacate the conditional transfer order. 15 8 In one of the
Grain Shipment cases, 159 a defendant in an action brought in the District
of Kansas, the transferee district for this litigation, filed a motion with
the Panel "to add his action to those already included in Docket No. 22
[actions previously transferred to the District of Kansas by the Panel] ."160
The Panel denied the motion stating:
Had this action been commenced outside of the District of Kansas,
we would have undoubtedly used a conditional transfer order [footnote omitted] to transfer it to the District of Kansas. We have
not used conditional transfer orders to assign other cases commenced
in transferee courts to the judge assigned by the Panel to conduct
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings [citing at n. 3: More
than forty tag-along cases originally filed in transferee courts have been
assigned to the Panel-designated judge by the transferee court itself.]
and we are disinclined to do so here. We think it unseemly for this
Panel to interfere with the internal affairs of any district court with
respect to assignment of actions filed in it before a motion to transfer
has been submitted to the district court in which the affected actions
are pending. We have no doubt that the transferee court, on proper
application of a party or sua sponte, will take whatever steps are
necessary to insure that this action is included in coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings being conducted by Judge Templar.' 61
The denial of defendant's motion was made without prejudice to the right
of any party to request the transferee court to assign the action to Judge
162
Templar for inclusion in coordinated pretrial proceedings.
156. Since tag-along cases are transferred by the Clerk of the Panel through
the conditional transfer order, the full Panel does not consider the merits of the
transfer unless a party files notice of opposition. Only orders of the Panel are reported in Federal Supplement. Conditional transfer orders entered by the Clerk are
not reported. The six cases in which a party opposed transfer are: In re Grain Shipments, United States v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 457 (JPML 1969);
In re Antibiotic Drugs, England v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 303 F. Supp. 1056 (JPML
1969) ; In re Gypsum Wallboard, 303 F. Supp. 510 (JPML 1969); In re Plumbing Fixtures, 302 F. Supp. 795 (JPML 1969) ; In re Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp.
794 (JPML 1969) ; In re Antibiotic Drugs, 301 F. Supp. 1158 (JPML 1969).
157. See note 156 supra. The only case in which a hearing was held was In re
Antibiotic Drugs, England v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 303 F. Supp. 1056 (JPML 1969).
158. The procedure used by the Panel in disposing of each of these cases consisted of three steps: (1) the motion to vacate the conditional transfer order was
denied; (2) the mandatory stay provided by rule 12 was lifted and (3) the Clerk
of the Panel was directed to transmit the order to the transferee court for filing and
distribution. See cases listed in note 156 supra.
159. In re Grain Shipments; United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 305 F. Supp.
3 (JPML 1969).
160. Id. at 4.
161. Id., citing at n.4: "See Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation,
§ 5.1, Clark Boardman Edition, pp. 81-83; 1 (pt. 2) Moore's Federal Practice, pp.
87-89; for discussion of assignment of related cases pending in a single district."
162. Id. As of the date of this writing, the defendants had not requested the
District of Kansas to assign the action to Judge Templar for inclusion in the coordinated pretrial proceedings. Letter received from Hon. George Templar, Judge of
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Hearing Procedures

Rule 8 expresses the Panel's preference for receiving testimony only at
formal hearings and in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'8 3 Rule 13 defines the procedure for conducting hearings. This
rule also requires opposing counsel for all parties to meet separately
prior to the hearing to organize their argument and select a spokesman
to represent their position.0 4 Total argument time for litigation not previously considered is limited to one hour. Consequently, all parties on
each side of the issue must present their contentions in an equally divided
portion of that hour. 165 This time limitation could be burdensome in
litigation involving numerous parties on each side with dissimilar interests,
unless mitigated by the Panel.
The last sentence of rule 13 states that "the issuance of a show cause
or hearing order does not affect or suspend orders and discovery proceedings in the District Courts in which the cases are pending." This
clause clearly indicates that only the Panel's order transferring cases
will remove a case from a district court's jurisdiction and until such an
order is issued, the district court has full control over the proceedings in
that case. However, once transfer is ordered, the transferor court no
longer has jurisdiction to make any determinations in the action.' 6 6 In
some instances involving tag--along cases, the parties have waived a hearing
and permitted the decision to rest on briefs submitted.6 7 In another case,
the United States District Court, District of Kansas, dated Mar. 19, 1970, on file at
Villanova Law Review Office.
163. Section 1407(c) requires a hearing only when transfer is contemplated. The
Panel held a hearing in the case of In re Eisler Patents, 297 F. Supp. 1034 (JPML
1968), but, since transfer was denied, there was no statutory requirement that a hearing be held. The Panel has stipulated in its order to show cause (rule 11) that no
further hearings would be held unless requested by a party. In re Air Crash Disaster
at Greater Cincinnati Airport, 298 F. Supp. 355, 356 (JPML 1969).
164. Id. This provision of rule 13 is analogous to FED. R. App. P. 33 which permits the court to direct counsel for both sides to meet with the court prior to hearing
argument to consider simplification of the issues and other matters which may aid
in the disposition of the proceeding. The need for such organization of argument
is shown in the Western Liquid Asphalt cases, where the Panel denied "several conditional, alternative and somewhat ambiguous motions . . . because of their ambiguity and complete lack of factual or legal support." 303 F. Supp. 1053, 1054
(JPML 1969).
165. Argument time in tag-along cases is limited to thirty minutes, also to be
divided equally between parties favoring and those opposing transfer. These provisions
of rule 13 limiting argument time are analogous to FED. R. App. P. 34(b).
166. See In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 493 (JPML 1968),
considered at pp. 929-30 supra; where the Panel ordered nine actions transferred from
the Southern District of New York to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and
refused to separate the class action issue from the other issues transferred. In support of its holding that the transferee court has exclusive jurisdiction over the transferred action, the opinion cited the following authorities: Phebus v. Search, 264 F.
407 (8th Cir. 1920) ; 21 C.J.S. COURTS § 517a (1940) ; 20 AM. JUR. 2d COURTS § 149
(1965) ; 56 Am. JUR. VENUE § 78 (1947). 298 F. Supp. at 496.
167. Rule 12 requires a party opposing the conditional transfer order to file a
brief in support of his opposition. Cases in which a hearing was waived are: In re
Grain Shipments, 304 F. Supp. 457 (JPML 1969) ; In re Gypsum Wallboard, 302
F. Supp. 794 (JPML 1969); In re Plumbing Fixtures, 302 F. Supp. 795 (JPML
1969).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8

28

Nyhan: A Survey of Federal Multidistrict Litigation - 28 U.S.C. 1407
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15

initiated by plaintiffs' motion to transfer, all counsel involved stipulated
to a waiver of the hearing previously ordered, and agreed that a section
1407 transfer to the Northern District of California was appropriate. 168
Rule 15 explains who may move for remand of an action, or any
separable part of an action, pursuant to subsection 1407(a).169 This rule
also delineates the authority of a transferee judge under subsection 1407(b)
to include the power to transfer for trial cases before the transferee court
for pretrial proceedings. This power to transfer for trial may be exercised
under the change of venue statute'7 0 or under the cure or waiver of
defects statute. 171 While district court judges have this power, the statute
does not explicitly state that transferee judges do also. The Panel's rule
clarifies this question.

3.

172

Motions fir Extensions of Time

Rule 14 authorizes the Clerk of the Panel to act on all applications
for an extension of time to file a pleading or perform a required act. This
broad delegation of authority to the Clerk is necessary because all judges
of the Panel have full time duties in their respective courts, each in
different circuits 78 located at a considerable distance from the Panel's
offices in Washington, D.C. The Clerk's action under this rule, as well
as under Rule 12, is reviewable by the Panel upon application by the
aggrieved party. 174 The Panel's delegation of limited authority to the
Clerk of the Panel meets an obvious need to permit continuous supervision
of multidistrict litigation, which none of the Panel members are in a
position to provide. The Rules allow review of the Clerk's action by the
full Panel where requested, and this seems adequate to protect all interests
involved. The Panel's endorsement of a transferee judge's authority to
consolidate for trial actions transferred to his court for pretrial proceedings only is a beneficial extension of the statute, consistent with the purpose
of section 1407. It may also be the seed for an amendment or an addition
to the Judicial Code permitting the Panel to transfer multidistrict litigation for consolidated trial purposes, in addition to the existing power to
transfer for consolidated pretrial purposes.
168. In re Water Meters, 304 F. Supp. 873 (JPML 1969). Notwithstanding
the stipulations of the litigants, the Panel held a hearing in this case, at which they
also considered the transfer of four cases not included in the original motion. Transfer of all actions in the litigation was ordered. Had the Panel not considered the
four additional cases, no hearing would have been required.
169. Rule 15(a) provides that the Panel may consider remand when requested
by one of the parties, by the transferor or transferee judge, or on its own initiative.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1964).
172. The Panel held that "[s]ections 1404(a), 1406(a) and 1407 are not mutually
exclusive and, when appropriate, should be used in concert to effect the most expeditious disposition of multidistrict litigation." In re Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 239, 242
(JPML 1969).
173. This geographical representation is required by Section 1407(d) which
provides that no two judges of the Panel shall be from the same circuit.
174. Requests for extensions in the courts of appeals are disposed of by a judge
of the court.
FnD.Charles
R. App.Widger
P. 26(b).
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ADVANTAGES

A.

AND DISADVANTAGES

OF SECTION

1407

From the Plaintiff's Viewpoint

Coordinated discovery proceedings in extensive litigation such as the
electrical equipment cases permits more comprehensive discovery directed
by larger plaintiff's prestigious, high powered counsel being made available to all parties participating in the transferee district, at a more economical cost to each party.1 75 Under subsection 1407(b), court supervised
discovery 7 6 conducted before a deposition judge according to a timetable
ordered by the transferee court, serves to frame issues for trial sooner,
allows a more rapid and orderly progression to trial, and prevents delays
in the discovery schedule by having a judge present to immediately rule on
objections raised. In the larger litigation lead counsel may divide areas of
responsibility. For example in litigation such as the electrical equipment
cases involving separate product lines, when discovery in one product line
is complete, counsel in charge may prepare for trial in that product line
for all plaintiffs, while associate lead counsel commences discovery in
another product line. This results in a reduction of the interval necessary
between completion of discovery and trial.' 77 The net effect of these
advantages to a plaintiff is that defendants in complex or protracted litigation no longer can expect to "achieve settlement at lower levels . . .
[by stretching] out the proceedings in treble damage cases until plaintiffs
175. Cf. O'Donnell, supra note 22, at 139 where the author stated:
The benefits from a national disposition program accrue across the board
to all plaintiffs. First, costs are lessened and, in fact, there may be virtually no
cost to a particular individual plaintiff. Like it or not, from the defendants'
standpoint the potential cost to be incurred by plaintiffs in prosecuting a triple
damage case is a factor which may lead to a favorable, reasonable and satisfactory settlement under ordinary circumstances. Second, and more important,
each plaintiff is handed a ready-made case to the extent that expert lead counsel
can establish it and, in any event, a far better case than most plaintiffs' counsel
could ever establish without the coordinated program.
Earlier, the author stated that:
[T]he amount and usefulness of information which may be obtained from a witness under examination can be dependent upon counsel's ability was underscored
...in an opinion denying a motion for release of a grand jury transcript: " . .
where disclosure was not made it was more due to the types of questions asked
than to any refusal to answer or failure of memory." Atlantic City Electric
Company v. General Electric Company, 1 71,382 (S.D.N.Y., February 15, 1965) ;
Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 244 F. Supp. 707, (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
Id. at 139 n.22.
See also 1967 Hearings, supra note 18, at 29; MANUAL, supra note 8, at 32 (use
of document depositories), 34-56 (proof of facts in complex cases - computer, samples,
polls, and survey evidence).
176. See text accompanying note 41 supra, and MANUAL, supra note 8, at 19
where it states:
A crucial step in the first phase of judicial management of complex cases is
the prompt entry of an order staying all pretrial proceedings until an initial
schedule of discovery is approved. Caveat: Except in rare cases for good cause
appearing, there should, however, be no stay of discovery which is not accompanied by a positive plan for the expeditious accomplishment of discovery or
disposition of the litigation without discovery. (Footnotes omitted).
See also Bane, supra note 22, at 124.
177. O'Donnell, supra note 22, at 141.
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become tired or discouraged.' 78 One questionable advantage experienced
by plaintiffs in the electrical equipment cases, and presumably available
in other treble damage cases, is the subtle prejudice against defendants
convicted earlier of a criminal antitrust violation. The unfavorable
publicity and the unavoidable presumption of guilt 7 9 tend to permit
plaintiffs, to the defendants' detriment, to associate their interests with
the "general welfare clause of the United States Constitution"'' s0 and to
8
focus attention on the national character of the issues.' '
One disadvantage to plaintiffs is that in the coordinated pretrial proceedings the interests of smaller parties may be subordinated to the legitimately greater interests of larger parties on the same side. 8 2 This may
be so because of practical necessity, or because of pressure from the
court.'8 3 However, in such instances, parties who have been denied the
opportunity to explore fully their particular interests in the consolidated
pretrial proceedings do have an alternative remedy. That is, they may
conduct local discovery when the case is remanded to the transferor
district for trial.18 4 Such local discovery would, of course, be conducted
by the individual litigant's counsel, who would no longer be under the
aegis of lead counsel. If local discovery in the transferor district prior to
trial is necessary, it may be questioned what benefit this particular party
has gained by participating in the coordinated proceedings. Another disadvantage to transfer under section 1407 is that a smaller party with a
relatively minor interest in the outcome of litigation may be forced to
178. Bane, supra note 22, at 129. Cf. In re Antibiotic Drugs, 301 F. Supp. 1158
(JPML 1969), where defendants' tentative settlement offer of $120,000,000 in satisfaction of all claims brought in 101 actions was refused by some plaintiffs.
179. See note 24 supra, discussing the use of such a conviction as prima fade
evidence of guilt in a civil action.
180. O'Donnell, supra note 22, at 136.
181. Id. at 140 n.27 where the author states:
In the first national deposition taken in the electrical cases plaintiffs' lead
counsel moved for production of a memorandum prepared after the witness had
testified before the grand jury. Plaintiffs' lead counsel stated in support of the
motion: "And certainly there is no public policy that protects [the memorandum]
and even if there were, in the case or cases of national magnitude and public
importance of this kind here, I think everybody is now trying to move discovery
along; it is idle .. .to .. .ask this witness a lot of questions when he has got a
document which we ought to see . . ." (National deposition of A.C. Allen,

October 1, 1962, pages N-71-72).
The memorandum was produced.
182. 1967 Hearings,supra note 18, at 96, where it is stated:
Moreover, while the cases are being "coordinated", many of the proceedings
will be within the control of counsel for a small number of the litigants. As the
number of cases and parties subject to mass handling increases, the attention and
respect given the positions of the smaller parties or lesser interests in the litigation inevitably diminishes. Such mass proceedings may well raise substantial
constitutional questions affecting, as they do, each litigant's right to have his case
handled by his own counsel and his right to due process.
See also Seeley, Procedures for Coordinated Multi-District Litigation: A Nineteenth
Century Mind Views with Alarm, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 91, 92 (1969).
183. The Panel exerts pressure on the parties by requiring them to meet prior
to a hearing, for the purposes of organizing their argument and selecting a spokesman to present the views of all parties on one side in the one-half hour argument
time allowed. See rule 13.
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travel a great distance at considerable expense to litigate, unless he is
willing to concede the issue.' 8 5 Such a situation arose in the Grain Shipment cases' 86 where one case was transferred from the Southern District
of Texas to the District of Kansas and the amount in controversy was
$365.30.1 7 In that instance a defendant was disadvantaged but the
principle is equally applicable to a plaintiff.
Smaller parties may not be the only ones to resist transfer. In the
Children's Books cases,' 8 8 each group of litigants wanted the Panel to
designate a different transferee district, namely the one most convenient
to the members of each group. The Panel characterized such a position
as a "worm's eye view of Section 1407."189 The Panel declined to select
either an east coast district or a west coast district, but opted for the
Northern District of Illinois, which happened to be the "center of gravity"'9 0
of the litigation. One critic of section 1407,191 commenting on his experiences as defense counsel in the electrical equipment cases, complained of
the following consequence, which works to plaintiffs' advantage:
These, and many other cases, were shipped about the country to suit
the convenience of the judges, and a major factor which seemed to
determine their destination was the willingness of a district judge to
accept them. All efforts to obtain appellate relief failed and, in the
Philadelphia cases, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
refused even to hear argument.
As the practice of transferring cases expanded it gave every
appearance of being employed entirely without regard to the convenience of parties and witnesses and either for the relief of judges who
didn't want to take the time and trouble to try some difficult cases, or,
more importantly, for the purpose of clubbing into settling their cases
parties who did not show what the judges thought was sufficient enthusiasm for disposing of their cases in that manner. A great mass of
cases were transferred to and consolidated in Chicago for trial and
trials were threatened involving many parties and many more individual transactions. Since it became apparent to the defendants that a trial
involving such a conglomerate mass of separate transactions would
be completely unmanageable and beyond the power of any jury to
resolve, no alternative was left but to settle great groups of cases in
185. Cf. Seeley, supra note 182, at 94, where the author says:
It is not alone . . . the cost of consolidated multi-district litigation which is
unfair to small defendants. The cost of participating in frequent conferences of

counsel, of producing documents in large multiples, of traveling to distant places

to attend hearings or depositions, or to inspect records, is indeed considerable.

What is more discouraging, however, is the feeling which must come to them
that they have no voice in what is going on and that the counsel through whom
they had hoped to be represented effectively are nearly as helpless as they
themselves to stem the onrushing tide of superefficiency.
186. In re Grain Shipments, 304 F. Supp. 457 (JPML 1969).
187. Id. at 458. See note 206 infra, for an explanation of why the Panel ordered
this action transferred.
188. In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385 (JPML 1968).
189. Id. at 386.
190. Id. at 387.
191. Letter from Phillip Price, Esq., to Senator Hugh Scott (Oct. 20, 1966)
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8
cited in 1967 Hearings, supra note 18, at 95.

32

Nyhan: A Survey of Federal Multidistrict Litigation - 28 U.S.C. 1407

948

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

15

bundles. In this manner some litigants were deprived of any opportunity of presenting such
defenses as they had to individual claims
192
or portions of claims.
And in regard to the effectiveness of the hearing required by subsection
1407(c), that same critic said:
[B]y the time the Co-Ordinating Committee decided to employ the
device of intercircuit transfer . . . at least the preliminary decisions
to make such transfers were arrived at by the judges in private
conversations with each other prior to receiving the factual and legal
arguments of counsel, at least counsel for the defendants. Such "hearings" as were held on sua sponte orders to show cause why the
transfers should not be made had no effect upon the outcome since
for all practical purposes the decisions to transfer had already been
made.193

Whatever advantage was available to a party in having the same
judge preside over both pretrial proceedings and the trial is lost where
the case is remanded for trial to the transferor district under subsection 1407(c). Even though the Manual recommends the assignment of
all matters, pretrial as well as trial, to a single judge, 94 this may not
be possible where there are a large number of actions. For example, in
the electrical equipment cases, 1,933 actions were handled by 34 judges
over a period of five years. 1
B.

5

From the Defendant's Viewpoint

Defendants ostensibly receive some benefits from multidistrict litigation procedures. The establishment of national document depositories should
make document production less expensive, less time consuming, and less
disruptive. 1 6 The existence of such depositories enables the court and
the parties to keep track of what has been produced, thus simplifying the
process for obtaining rulings on requests for discovery or protective
orders. 19 7 The use of national depositions, as utilized in the electrical
equipment cases, obviously benefits defendants in that individuals involved may be deposed once, rather than thirty-four times in thirty-four
different locations, as might otherwise be the case. 198 The presence of a
judge at pretrial proceedings enables the defendant to obtain immediate
rulings on objections, request for production of documents or preclusion
orders.' 9
192. Id. at 97.
193. Id.
194. MANUAL, supra note 8, at 12.
195. See notes 23, 26 and accompanying text supra.
196. See MANUAL supra note 8, at 32. See also Bane, supra note 22, at 125-26.
197. MANUAL, supra note 8. at 32.
198. See, e.g., O'Donnell, supra note 22, at 137.
199. University
Id. at 138.Charles
See MANUAL,
supra
noteDigital
8, at Repository,
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These same advantages however, may also have a detrimental impact
on defendants. The information obtained from national document depositories and from national depositions is also available to all plaintiffs. 200
Traditional defense tactics are no longer available. 20 1 The particular
interests of smaller defendants may be subordinated to the interests of
larger defendants, 20 2 and smaller parties with a minor stake in the outcome
may be forced to concede the issue or litigate at great expense. 20 3
C.

From the Court's Viewpoint

The judiciary benefits greatly from the transfer provided by section
1407. Court dockets in many districts may be congested as a result of an
incident giving rise to multidistrict litigation. By resorting to section 1407,
these cases may be consolidated in one district, and assigned to a single
judge. Thus, even though one judge must devote more of his time to
the particular litigation, other judges are released to consider other litigation. It cannot be disputed that this is a more efficient use of judges'
time. The presence of a judge at the pretrial proceedings prevents delay,
contributing to the more efficient administration of justice. 20 4 The suggestion has been made that the Panel would be free under section 1407
to transfer litigation to any district it desires. 20 5 While it might seem
attractive to permit the judiciary to select the forum in which litigants
must try their cause, the Panel has properly refrained from transferring
cases to particular districts for reasons of judicial convenience alone. Even
in the case where actions were transferred to the "center of gravity" of
the litigation involved, the Panel had legitimate reasons for its order. 20 6
Furthermore, the Panel is not forced to transfer actions to districts with
less crowded dockets in order to efficiently utilize the time of those judges
available. Once transfer is determined to be appropriate, 20 7 the Panel
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See text accompanying note 175 supra.
See note 178 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 182-83 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 185-87 and accompanying text supra..
But see Seely, supra note 182, at 92 where the author opines:
The chief virtue claimed for consolidated multi-district procedures is their
efficiency in disposing of a great volume of litigation with a minimum of time and
effort. Efficiency, however, is not necessarily the highest goal of the law. There
will come a day, perhaps sooner than we imagine, when someone will devise a
computer capable of deciding cases in seconds and motions in milli-seconds. One
can hardly look forward to that day with any satisfaction, however, except from
the premise that the main purpose of the courts is to get rid of litigation by the
fastest means possible.

205. Bane, supra note 22, at 130.
206. In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 387 (JPML
1968) where the court said:
A number of reasons support [transfer to the Northern District of Illinois].
The United States filed its seminal antitrust actions in that district and of course,
the grand jury documents relating to the actions are in Chicago. Many of the
plaintiffs in the instant cases sought to intervene in the Government's cases; many
applied to the district court for release of documents subpoenaed in connection
with the grand jury's investigation before the Government filed suit.
207. See notes 60-65 and accompanying text supra for considerations taken into
account by the Panel before ordering transfer.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/8
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may request the assignment of a judge from any circuit to conduct pretrial
proceedings in the transferee district.208 This offers the same efficient
use of the judge-hour without forcing the litigants to travel to a forum
selected as the most convenient for the judiciary.
Some objectionable effects of section 1407 on the judiciary are
noticeable. In pretrial proceedings of private antitrust actions, judges
must resist the prejudicial impact of a defendant's prior criminal antitrust conviction. They must also resist the subtle identification of plaintiffs' interests with the public interest. 20 9 While pressure exists on an
individual judge to rule on the class action issue, 210 this would also be
true without section 1407. Finally, there is the consideration that litigants
21
who otherwise might not have the inclination nor resources to file suit '
212
with the expectation of
would file, as they are entitled to by law,
realizing the advantages of a section 1407 transfer of multidistrict litigation considered earlier.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Panel has demonstrated consistent, pragmatic judgment in deciding whether related litigation should be transferred under section 1407.
Its orders and opinions have considered both sides to questions presented,
and it has made reasonable, well justified determinations, consistent with
the intent of the drafters and the legislature. The Panel's Rules of
Procedure make necessary adjustments to normal judicial procedure to
accommodate the unique conditions created by section 1407.
It has been shown that transfer under section 1407 generally works
for the benefit of the judiciary and plaintiffs. The apparent benefits to
defendants may, in some instances, be offset by the loss of some traditional advantages defendants have known. The Panel's action is compatible
with the statute, its Rules of Procedure and the Manual. Counsel familiar
with each of these should be able to predict accurately the disposition of
actions before the Panel.

F. 1. Nyhant
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (Supp. IV, 1969), and see note 72 supra.
209. See notes 180-81 and accompanying text supra.
210. See

MANUAL,

supra note 8, at 29.

211. Cf., H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 3, at 1902.
212. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 4 (1964).
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